Tag Archives: fairness

New extended essay out for Journal of Medical Ethics with Davide Battisti: “A proposal for formal fairness requirements in triage emergency departments”

The pandemic has revealed the tragic reality of triage: in extraordinary situations, triage interventions may not be able to save all lives.

However, even in ordinary, non-disaster contexts, the principles underlying triage intervention demand careful consideration. First, triage remains a daily reality in various healthcare systems, particularly in the Global South, where resources are limited.

One of the many examples of triage classifications.

Second, triage criteria and procedures are seldom transparent, accessible, or justified to the public. Further, they are also rarely consistent across different countries, and even within the same country, different hospitals will often adopt a different triage system. That means that an ED patient in Bristol and an ED patient in Leeds, with the same condition, might be assigned different colours, corresponding to different priorities. Some of this variability is inherent in the system: different operators will rank patients differently within a certain expected margin. However, some of this procedural inconsistencies are avoidable. To this end, the criteria used to rank patients should be made publicly accessible, and transparent. Therefore, an in-depth conceptual and empirical exploration of ED triage in ordinary circumstances is needed to promote fair and legitimate ED triage in everyday life.

Our paper (doi: jme-2023-109188) addresses this need by proposing five requirements that should be respected to ensure a fair triage from the point of view of procedural fairness, building on the seminal work of “accountability for reasonableness” proposed by Daniels and Sabin, and applying it to the context of EDs. We also outline conceptual and empirical research questions to determine whether ED triage meets the five requirements of procedural fairness, particularly in specific national or state contexts. This is a vastly under-researched area in bioethics, at the convergence of emergency medicine, theories of justice, and democratic theory. We hope that, like us, you will find it important and fascinating and will decide to contribute to its development.

The paper can be accessed here:

https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2023/08/24/jme-2023-109188

If you’d like to read the paper however don’t have institutional access to the journal please drop me a note to request the PDF –> silvia.camporesiATunivie.ac.at

#emergencydepartments #ED #triage #fairness #resourceallocation #justice #bioethics #medicalethics

My commentary on Dutee Chand’s case: When is it fair to be a woman in athletic competition?

The hearing of Dutee Chand is currently underway at the Court for Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne.

Dutee Chand

Dutee Chand

Dutee Chand (19 yo) was disqualified just days before the beginning of the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in July 2014 after a medical test determined that her androgen level was above the “normal” limit set by IAAF and IOC policies of 10 nmol/lit. According to the IAAF Regulations (May 2011, link) if Chand is able to reduce her androgen levels to fall within the normal testing range, she will be allowed to resume international competition. She refused to do so and appeal.

The assumption of the IAAF regulations is that hyperandrogenism/testosterone confers an unfair advantage and disrupts the level playing field.

I provided some commentary on Dutee Chand’s appeal for BBC World News Hour on Monday, March 23rd. You can listen to the clip here.

I also participated in a debate on BBC World Service Have Your Say last night. The podcast is available here.

Here’s in brief what I think about the case:

Even if it were case proven (and it is not) that higher levels of androgens provided an advantage, that would not imply that it were unfair. In other words, we do not care whether testosterone provides an advantage or not, we care whether that advantage is unfair. And to demonstrate that it is not we reflect on bigger questions, such as the meaning of athletic excellence, and gender and performing feminity in sport.

We think that exceptional biological and genetic variations are considered part of what the elite athlete is, and of what makes sports completion valuable and admirable: achieving excellence through the combination of talent – the natural endowment of the athlete- and dedication – the efforts in training and preparation that the athlete put forth to maximize what her talent offers. That is we, together with the governing bodies of athletics, do not consider unfair many other genetic variation many other biological and genetic variations which confer an advantage in sport. For example, endurance athletes have mitochondrial vairations that increase aerobic capacity and endurance. More genetic variations and polymorphisms in the genetic basis of sport performance are unravelled as we speak. Why aren’t such genetic and biological variations consider unfair? Because it is part of what we think elite athletes are. The level playing field in competition, which is one of the arguments that is going to be used to upheld the IAAF regulations in the courtoom, does not exist. It is a myth.

 Why is hyperandrogenism singled out? It is only one of these variations. I argue that it is singled out as it challenges deeply entrenched social beliefs of women in sport in a way that other variations do not.

I argue that the IAAF/IOC are now faced with a disruptive dilemma: Either ban from competition all athletes who derive an advantage from biological variations, or let everybody who is “out of the ordinary,” compete, athletes with hyperandrogenism included.

If they do not do so and uphold their regulations, they will stand to create many levels of unfairness while upholding the very opposite fairness ideal.